


























































































































































































The aim of this paper is two-fold: First, assuming public debts are pre-determined and in their
steady state in EU countries, the paper investigates the effect of asymmetric debt service
obligations on taxes, primary spending and the tax mix in EU countries. Second, it investigates
how increased tax competition may change these effects. The impact of debt service on taxes,
primary spending and the tax mix is derived in a simple model of tax competition, and the
hypotheses derived from the model are tested empirically for a panel of EU countries. Cross-
country differences in public debts are found to lead to asymmetries in taxes and primary
expenditures across EU countries, with high debt countries having lower expenditures and higher
taxes than low debt countries. Capital mobility is found to increase these asymmetries, and trigger
cross-country asymmetries in the tax mix of EU countries.
JEL classification: H6, H23, H73, H87, F02




The public debts of European Union countries are high and differ widely, and hence entail large
and differing public debt servicing across member states. As an example, Italy spent an average
of 17% of incoming tax revenues on interest payments on the public debt between 1970 to 1999,
while the corresponding percentage for Finland was 4%. Assuming that the Maastricht criteria
and the Stability Pact have lead to very limited reliance on deficit finance, the debt service
associated with the large and differing public debt levels either must crowd out primary spending
or increase tax revenues, or lead to a combination of the two. One can hence ask the question, has
Italy a higher level of taxation or a lower level of primary spending than Finland, due to debt
service, and all else being equal? More generally, does public debt service lead to higher taxes or
lower spending in EU countries, assuming that public debts are in steady state and governments
operate in a ‘close to balance’ environment? And in turn, do high debt countries spend less or tax
more relative to low debt countries, such that public debt asymmetries imply spending and tax
asymmetries across EU countries as well?
One can take the line of questioning one step further by observing that higher capital mobility and
intensifying tax competition is suspected to add a downward pressure on tax rates in European
Union countries, and to increase the level of distortions and deadweight loss associated with a
given tax rate. If countries with high public debt have higher tax rates in order to service the debt,
does this mean that high-debt countries increasingly suffer tax induced distortions relative to low-
debt countries due to increased tax competition? Or does tax competition mean that the effect of
high debt service increasingly falls on the spending side of the budget rather than the tax side? Or
does tax competition increasingly shift the burden of debt servicing from capital toward less
mobile factors, such as labor?
Taking the levels of public debt as given in steady state, this paper investigates the effects of
public debt asymmetries and tax competition on taxes and primary spending in the EU.
As the discussion above implies, two overall questions are addressed. First, may asymmetric
levels of public debt across the European Union in themselves be a source of asymmetries in the
size of the public sector, the overall tax level and the tax mix? Second, does tax competition
increase or decrease the asymmetries in the size and in the tax structure of the state?
In order to formalize the questions, a simple model of tax competition augmented with a debt
service term in the budget constraint is derived. The derivatives of the tax rate and government
expenditures with respect to debt service are presented for the two extreme cases of zero capital
mobility and perfect capital mobility. The model is subsequently augmented with taxation of an
immobile tax base, to see whether capital mobility changes the relative impact of debt service on
the taxation of the two tax bases. The model yields six testable hypotheses about the effect of debt
service on the tax level, primary spending and the tax mix. These hypotheses are then tested
empirically using panel regression techniques, for a panel of EU countries.
The results of the empirical investigation imply that public debt asymmetries are associated with
asymmetries in the levels of taxes and primary expenditures across EU countries, with high debt
countries having smaller public sectors and higher taxes than low debt countries. Moreover, it is	
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found that capital mobility may increase these asymmetries while also triggering cross-country
asymmetries in the tax mix of EU countries. Thus, when capital mobility increases, the tax
increases made necessary by higher debt service obligations may fall increasingly on labor
income and consumption rather than on capital. These findings have several implications. First,
high-debt EU countries may be suffering from higher tax induced distortions to their economy
compared to their lower-debt counterparts. Second, high debt levels in some EU countries, may,
all else equal, have provided a mitigating effect on the tendency of the public sector (measured as





The public sectors of European welfare states have reached unprecedented levels in history.
Defining the size of the public sector in terms of the level of primary expenditures, the public
sectors of EU countries have grown from an average of 33.2% in 1970 to an average of 45.4% in
2000, with this growth only halting in the 1990s
2. While public sector growth has taken place in
virtually all European countries, its financing has differed widely, leaving the levels of public
debt ranging from 46% of GDP in Finland to 116% of GDP in Belgium in 1999. Column 1 of
table 1 shows the distribution of public debt to GDP ratios in EU member countries in 1999, and
the accompanying debt service obligations.
The high and asymmetric levels of public debt across EU countries have been the trigger of a
strain of literature aiming at empirically identifying the causes of these asymmetries. Roubini and
Sachs (1989) opened this literature by searching for economic and political determinant of the
budget deficit, which was followed by de Haan and Sturm (1994) and (1997), Hallerberg and von
Hagen (1999), de Haan Moessen and Volkerink (1999), de Haan Sturm and Beekhuis (1999), and
Kontopoulus and Perotti (1998) - the list is not exhaustive.
This paper looks at the facts from a different angle by considering the effects instead of the causes
of public debt asymmetries. The public debt is taken as having reached a steady state level, and
the effect of the associated asymmetric debt service obligations on other budget items is
investigated. By assuming that changes in public finances induced by debt are neutral, in the
sense that spending and taxation will change such that there is no change in the primary budget
balance and hence in turn in the debt, the secondary effects of changes in the budget on the level
of debt and sustainability are disregarded
3. Hence, in contrast to the above-mentioned literature
on the determination of public debt levels, this paper studies the causality from debt to primary
spending and taxation assuming that debt is pre-determined – not the other way around.
Two overall questions are addressed. First, given the observation that the levels of public debt
differ substantially across EU member countries, the question of how these asymmetries may lead
to asymmetries in the fiscal policies of EU countries is posed. In other words, may asymmetric
levels of public debt across the European Union in itself be a source of asymmetries in the size of
the public sector, the overall tax level and the tax mix? Second, since tax competition in the
European Union is under suspicion of putting pressure on taxes and, in turn, public spending, and
of changing the tax mix, the question is raised as to whether recent trends of increasing tax
competition in the European Union may change the way asymmetries in public debt lead to
asymmetries in spending and taxation. Put differently, does tax competition increase or decrease
the asymmetries in the size and in the tax structure of the state?
The mechanism through which the given level of public debt affects overall taxes, primary
expenditures and the tax mix is the associated debt servicing item in the government budget
                                                
2Level of government defined as level of primary expenditures. Source: OECD Economic Outlook and own
calculations. The average excludes the UK and Denmark, and only enters Ireland and Greece from when their series
start, since they start in the 1970s (the data for UK and DK only starts in the 1980s).
3 Except in as far as this becomes a source of endogeneity in the empirical analysis.	
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constraint. Clearly, debt service obligations provide a substantial wedge in the budget of higher-
debt countries, while this in not the case in lower-debt countries, all else equal. The last two
columns of table 1 give an idea of the relative importance of debt service in the budgets of EU
countries. Italy, Belgium and Greece take the lead by spending between 14% and 18% of tax
revenues on interest for the public debt in 1999, compared to between 6% and 8% for France,
Finland and the United Kingdom. The wedge in the budget stemming from debt service must
affect either the level of tax revenues or the level of primary expenditures, assuming that there is
a limitation to deficit financing. If debt servicing were to mainly result in higher taxes, and
assuming that the excess burden of taxation is increasing in the tax level, this would imply that
high debt results in a higher level of tax induced distortions to the economy
4. If, alternatively,
debt service is found to mainly result in lower primary spending, it would mean that debt can be
considered a mitigating factor for the tendency of the public sector, as defined by primary
expenditures, to grow.
Capital mobility and the potential for tax competition have increased dramatically in the
European Union over the last decades. The mechanism for how increased tax competition may
change the way public debt affects public finances is over the change in marginal costs of public
funds associated with increasing tax competition. In short, tax competition raises the distortionary
cost of a higher tax rate, and debt service could therefore be expected to increasingly result in
lower primary spending instead of higher taxes. Moreover, it could also be expected that a given
additional tax burden resulting from debt servicing would mainly be put on labor and
consumption rather than on mobile capital.
To formalize these hypotheses, Section 1 presents a simple model of tax competition augmented
with a debt service term in the budget constraint. The model is static, representing steady state,
since sustainability issues are not the focus of the investigation. The derivatives of the tax rate
and government expenditures with respect to debt service are presented for the two extreme cases
of zero capital mobility and perfect capital mobility. The model is subsequently augmented with
taxation of an immobile tax base, to see whether capital mobility changes the relative impact of
debt service on the taxation of the two tax bases. The model yields six testable hypotheses about
the effect of debt service on tax level, primary spending and the tax mix.
An empirical methodology for testing the six hypotheses is presented in Section 2. The simple
theoretical model does not provide a fully-fledged structural framework from which an estimating
equation can be derived. Instead, a framework for estimating tax and expenditure equations is
derived by borrowing from the previously mentioned extensive empirical literature on
determinants of the budget initiated by Roubini and Sachs (1989), as well as from the less
developed empirical literature on the effects of capital mobility on taxes and expenditures.
Section 3 presents data for a panel of 13 EU countries, while the empirical results are presented in
Section 4. The final section concludes.
                                                




1. Debt service in a Tax Competition Model of Fiscal Policy
In order to look at the effects of capital mobility on the effects of debt service on the budget, a
standard tax competition model as in Zodrow and Mierzkowski (1989) is augmented with
asymmetric levels of debt and debt service obligations. The complete model is presented in
appendix. This section presents the main conclusions concerning the effects of debt service on
taxes and spending in the two extreme cases of zero capital mobility and perfect capital mobility.
Zodrow and Mierzkowski assume an infinity of countries existing for only one period, and each
country consists of a government and a representative citizen, who owns the production of a
single (or composite) consumption good. The only input in production is capital, which enters
with diminishing marginal returns
5. Since the representative citizen owns the domestic
production, he receives the profits after the employed capital is paid its marginal product. The
representative citizen also owns a fixed amount of capital (his savings), which is invested in the
production of the consumption good. Investments are made in the home production if capital is
immobile, and savings may be invested domestically or abroad, wherever the after tax return to
capital is highest, if capital is perfectly mobile. The government provides a public good, g, which
may be transformed to a private consumption good at a one to one rate. The government also pays
debt service on a predetermined amount of public debt, and levies a unit source tax on capital
employed in domestic production in order to pay for the public good provision and the debt
service. Assuming a balanced budget requirement, the budget constraint hence amounts to
rD g k t + = ⋅
6. The government chooses the tax rate that maximizes a utility function,  ) , ( x g u ,
which is increasing in expenditures on public goods (henceforth primary expenditures), g, and in
the after-tax income of the representative citizen, x. The utility function can be thought of as the
utility function of the representative citizen, the government being benevolent. Alternatively, the
objective function can be thought of as the own utility function of a Leviathan government, who
maximizes the size of the government (i.e. expenditures) as well as the probability of re-election,
which could be assumed to be correlated with the after-tax income of the representative citizen.
The equilibrium in terms of the tax level or size of government is the same in the two cases, the
difference only consisting in whether the equilibrium tax rate is too high or too low from a social-
optimum point of view. Since the purpose of the modeling is to draw positive rather than
normative conclusions about the impact of debt service on the budget variables for empirical
testing, the view of government is irrelevant in the present context.
The case of zero capital mobility
Assume initially that capital mobility is zero (this in effect means that we look at one country
isolated from the rest of the world since trade in capital is the only link between countries in this
model). The representative citizen can only invest in the domestic production, irrespective of the
domestic after-tax return to capital relative to that of other countries. In this case, the capital
source tax does not have an effect on the investment decision and the marginal cost of public
                                                
5 This can be thought of as a constant returns to scale production function with capital and labor as the two inputs,
and where the representative citizen provides a fixed amount of labor.
6 rD can hence be any obligatory lump sum transfer into or out of the budget, which does not yield or substract utilty
or create distortions by itself. Another example could be oil revenues.	
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funds is unity (i.e. increasing overall tax revenues of the government by increasing the tax rate
will result in a one to one decrease in private net income)
 7.









Totally differentiating the first order condition with respect to debt service obligations, rD, and
using the first order condition and the government budget constraint, the derivatives of the



























where εg is the elasticity of the marginal utility of government spending with respect to the tax
rate and εx is the equivalent for the net income of the representative citizen
8, and the superscript n
denotes no capital mobility equilibrium values.
This simple model of fiscal policy hence confirms the general intuition about how debt service
payments are dealt with in the budget: one should expect to see a combination of a lower level of
government spending and a higher level of taxes in countries with higher debt service obligations
compared to countries with lower debt service obligations, all else equal. Splitting up the cost of
debt service on taxes and primary expenditures minimizes the utility loss associated with debt
service payments, and this is strictly due to the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of
private net income as well as public spending. The division of adjustment between taxes and
primary expenditures is determined by the parameters of the model. The greater (smaller) in
absolute value the elasticity of the marginal utility of public goods provision (private net income)
to the tax rate, the less primary expenditures will be adjusted and the more taxes will increase due
to higher debt service.
Allowing for perfect capital mobility
Increased tax competition in theory limits the tax-raising powers of the government, and higher
factor mobility may hence have an impact on the policy response to changes in debt service
obligations – or changes in any other lump sum obligatory transfer for that matter. To see how
capital mobility affects the above derivatives, the extreme case of perfect capital mobility is
                                                
7 The definition of the marginal cost of public funds is the amount of private resources a one unit increase in tax
revenues would cost, including both the direct transfer of tax from private or business to the government and the
deadweight loss the increased tax imposes.
8 The presence of k in the numerator of the tax rate derivative, while missing in the derivative of primary
expenditures, stems from the fact that t is a tax rate, i.e. total taxes divided by the tax base, whereas g is the total
amount of public primary expenditures.	
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evaluated. The representative household will invest its savings where the after-tax return to
capital is highest, and capital flows will equalize the national after-tax returns to capital to the
world after-tax rate of return. When the domestic tax rate is increased, the initial after tax return
to capital will be lower and capital will therefore initially flow out of the country, until the
marginal product of capital has increased with the same amount as the tax increase, leaving the
after-tax rate of return unchanged. A change of the tax rate therefore has an impact on the
investment decision of the representative citizen, or in other words, taxes are distortionary. The
marginal cost of public funds is therefore greater than one, since a one unit increase in tax
revenues results in a more than one unit fall in private net income due to the initial capital










Under perfect capital mobility, the equilibrium marginal utility of public goods is higher than the
marginal utility of private consumption since the relative cost of public good provision is higher.
The government therefore sets a tax rate, which is lower than the optimal tax rate under zero
capital mobility. The derivatives of the equilibrium tax rate and government spending with































where the superscript p denotes the perfect capital mobility equilibrium values and εm is the
elasticity of the marginal cost of public funds with respect to the tax rate under perfect capital
mobility. The derivative of the tax rate with respect to debt service is smaller under perfect capital
mobility, and the derivative of government spending is higher under perfect capital mobility
(under certain conditions on the parameters of the model, the odd case of the derivative of the tax
rate being larger under perfect capital mobility is allowed for by the model. See appendix).
Hence, according to this simple capital tax competition model under certain conditions on the
size of the parameters, paying debt service obligations by increasing the tax rate becomes
increasingly distortionary as capital mobility and tax competition increase. According to the
model, one budgetary effect of higher capital mobility may therefore be that high debt countries
increasingly finance debt service obligations by reducing expenditures instead of levying higher
taxes.
Allowing for taxation of immobile tax bases
A weakness of the above model is that it does not take into account that the government has
other, less mobile, bases to tax. Extending the model to include taxation of an immobile tax base
can be done very simply by letting the representative citizen provide some fixed amount of labor
to the domestic production process and taxing this labor supply at the source. In this case, both	
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tax rates are non-distortionary when capital is assumed internationally immobile and so the
relative importance of the two is of no consequence to the net income level of the representative
citizen, since both tax rates subtract income from her/him. Assuming that, ceteris paribus, the
government prefers to set equal tax rates for simplicity or equity considerations, the effect of debt
service on taxes and expenditures in this model will be the same as above, with the only
difference that the change in the overall tax rate will be equally split between labor and capital
taxation. When capital is allowed to flow freely across borders, however, capital taxation will be
distortionary and hence more costly than the labor tax as a means of raising public funds. As a
consequence, capital mobility will switch the entire tax burden onto labor taxation. Along the
same line of reasoning, the part of public funds spent on paying debt service will switch from
being paid by labor and capital equally to stemming entirely from labor taxation. Hence, the
derivative of the capital income tax with respect to debt service should go from positive to zero
while the derivative of the labor income tax rate should increase in order to take over the full




















The labor supply could be assumed to be elastic with respect to the tax rate by including disutility
of labor in the utility function of the representative citizen. Allowing for an elastic labor supply
would moderate the above result such that the capital mobility would not result in a complete
switch to labor taxation (rather, the relative importance of the two taxes would be determined by
the elasticities of the two tax bases through the Ramsey rule for optimal taxation) but in essence
the result would be the same: The higher the capital mobility, the more of the tax burden is
switched to the other factor, and the less of an increase in debt service would be paid by capital
taxation relative to labor taxation.
Since consumption is also a potentially less mobile tax base, the above reasoning predicts that the
higher the capital mobility is, the more the tax rate will increase on labor or consumption relative
to the increase in capital taxation due to an increase in debt service.
Summary: 6 hypotheses about the effects of debt service on the budget
To sum up, the following six hypotheses are derived from the tax competition model of fiscal
policy:
The higher the debt service obligations, the
H1: Higher the average over-all tax-rate	
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H2: Lower the primary expenditure
The higher the capital mobility, the
H3: Smaller the effect of debt service on taxes
H4: Greater the negative effect of debt service on spending
H5.  Greater the effect of debt service on labor income taxes relative to capital income taxes
H6.  Greater the effect of debt service on consumption income taxes relative to capital income
taxes
The six hypotheses are tested empirically in the next two sections.
2. Empirical Methodology
The Basic Specification
The theory presented in the previous section should be seen as providing predictions on the
effects of debt service on the two sides of the budget. The tax competition model does not
provide a fully-fledged structural framework from which an estimating equation can be derived.
A framework for estimation is therefore inspired by two separate strands of empirical literature:
Tax basic specification has been borrowed from the empirical literature on determinants of taxes,
expenditures and the size of the budget deficit, while the inclusion of capital mobility has been
inspired by the empirical literature on the effects of capital mobility on overall taxes and
expenditures. Roubini and Sachs (1989a), belonging to the former strand of literature, propose an
estimating equation for the yearly budget deficit including debt service as a separate item, and
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998), also belonging to the former strand of literature, use this basic
specification – with slight alterations - for the two sides of the budget, taxes and expenditures as
percentages of GDP. In line with Kontopolous and Perotti (1989), the following basic













































The dependent variable, BUDGET, is tax revenues in percent of GDP (TAX/GDP) when testing
H1 and primary public expenditure in percent of GDP (EXP/GDP) when testing H2. BY is the
ratio of public debt to GDP, and is included with a lag. RB is debt service obligations, which are
also included with a lag to allow for policy to respond to changes. UB is the unemployment rate.	
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GR is the real GDP growth rate and INFL is the percentage change in the consumer price index.
MAAS is a dummy for the “Maastricht years” and takes the value 1 from 1993 and onward. υi is a
country specific error term (can be fixed or random) while εit is the country and time specific
error term. See appendix for the precise definition of the variables used in the regressions.
The lagged gross debt to GDP ratio is included to control for efforts made to stabilize the budget.
The tax ratio should therefore be a positive function of the lagged deficit while expenditures
should be a negative function of the lagged deficit. The change in the unemployment rate is
included to account for counter-cyclical fiscal policy and is therefore expected to affect the tax
ratio negatively and expenditures positively. The real growth rate is expected to have a negative
effect on expenditures to GDP ratio and the tax ratio in the short run, due to the cyclicality of the
budget. Current growth should hence imply lower expenditures and revenues to GDP
9. Current
inflation may change the tax brackets in which income is taxed, since income brackets are
nominal. Moreover, current inflation may be taken as a proxy for money growth and can hence be
used to control for monetary financing of the budget. It is important to control for the monetary
financing of the budget, since the use of seignorage has differed considerably across EU countries
during the last 30 years. There is hence no clear expectation of the sign of the effect of current
inflation on overall taxes, while the effect of inflation on total spending is expected to be positive.
Lagged changes in real growth and inflation are included to control for the potential omitted
variables bias due to these variables being correlated with the measure of debt service used as
well as with the dependent variable (see the section on measures of debt service below). The
dummy for the Maastricht years is entered to acknowledge that the nature of public finances
changed during the run-up to the introduction of the single currency
10.
If the real growth rate and debt service are not included in the above, the estimating equation is
similar to the benchmark specification of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998) for tax and expenditure
ratios and for the primary deficit. And if BUDGET is set equal to the gross debt to GDP ratio, the
equation is similar to the Roubini and Sachs (1989a) type of estimating equation
11.
When testing for stationarity of the country specific data series in levels
12, a unit root cannot be
rejected for the majority of the country specific series for tax revenues or expenditures to GDP or
unemployment, while a unit root is rejected for most of the countries when the first differences of
taxes and expenditures in percent of GDP is tested. Although the length (or, rather, the lack
thereof) of the country specific series implies that the strength of the unit root test is very low, the
model is estimated in first differences to reduce problems of this potential non-stationarity. All
included variables are hence first differenced in the benchmark regression, as indicated by the
delta in EQ.1 above. Since growth and inflation hardly have unit roots, however, it could be
                                                
9 It can also be argued that according to Wagner’s Law, growth should lead to preferences for larger government and
hence to higher taxes and expenditures in percent of GDP. But this is a longer-term argument as opposed to the
above, and will not be taken into account here. Most empirical tests of Wagner’s Law have rejected the hypothesis.
10 To account more fully for the change in behavior of public financed due to the Maastricht process, interaction
terms between the Maastricht dummy and the explanatory variables would be appropriate to include. This is done as
a robustness check and results are shown in table 6. Since the interaction term is not significant and does not change
the relevant parameter estimates, this interaction term is left out for reasons of parsimony.
11 With the only difference that inflation is added to the regression and proposed by Kontopoulos and Perotti 1998.
12 The results of ADF unit root tests can be downloaded from heiwww.unige.ch/~krogstr6/thesis/index.htm	
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argued that these should be included in levels while first differencing the rest of the model.
Estimating the model with growth and inflation in levels is carried out as a robustness check and
commented on below.
The specification could alternatively be estimated entirely in levels including the lagged
explanatory variable, but when the lagged dependent variable is included in a fixed effects panel
regression, this introduces a bias due to the correlation of the lagged dependent with the fixed
effects. The levels specification is also tested in the robustness analysis, but will not be
emphasized due to the potential bias and unit roots. Including fixed effects (as will be shown to
be appropriate in the next section) in the first difference specification allows for the country
specific time trend in the levels. To facilitate comparison, a country specific time trend is
therefore included when the levels specification is tested.
Another potential data problem is endogeneity. If the contemporaneous changes in debt service
were used as regressor, and not the lag, there could be a case of endogeneity, since higher tax
revenues (lower spending), would lead to a decrease of the public debt, in turn reducing debt
service. Since all else is not necessarily equal, this correlation is not necessarily a problem,
though. Now, the lag and not the contemporaneous value of changes in debt service is used as
explanatory variable. Using the lag of debt service eliminates the problem of endogeneity
described above, but creates another potential source of endogeneity: Changes in tax revenues or
spending may potentially be correlated with the lagged changes (i.e. there may be persistence in
the changes of taxes and spending), which in turn would be correlated with the lagged change in
debt as described above. If changes in taxes or expenditures are auto-correlated and the first
difference of taxes or expenditures are correlated with the contemporaneous change in debt
service, then endogeneity may be a problem. If, however, the first differences of taxes or
expenditures are not persistent, or if the first difference of taxes or expenditures is not correlated
with the contemporaneous change in debt service, there should not be a problem of endogeneity,
and when calculating the latter correlation, it in fact turns out to be minor
13. Endogeneity is hence
not considered to be a problem. Moreover, since the presence of endogeneity would bias the
parameter estimates toward zero, the true parameter estimates would have the same sign but be
larger in absolute value than the biased estimate. The presence of endogeneity would therefore
still allow drawing qualitative conclusions, although the parameter estimates would only indicate
a lower limit to what the true estimate would be.
Allowing for Capital Mobility to affect Policy Responses to Debt Service in the
estimating equation
Increasing capital mobility affects the budget in two ways according to the tax competition
model: it has a direct effect on the equilibrium tax rate and level of primary expenditures - the
                                                
13Levels of contemporaneous taxes and debt service are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.52
(using the first or second lead of debt service does not change the positive correlation to negative correlation). Levels
of contemporaneous expenditures and debt are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.33 (using the
first or second lead of debt service makes the positive correlation stronger). Changes in contemporaneous taxes and
debt service are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.01. Changes in the contemporaneous
expenditures and debt are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.02.	
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traditional tax competition hypothesis - and it affects the reaction to changes in government debt
service. Following the empirical specification of Garreth and Mitchell (2001), who study the
effects of capital mobility of budget variables, an index of capital mobility is included in the
estimating equation in addition to an interaction term between this capital mobility index and the



























































Where Icap is an index of the degree of capital mobility. The next section contains a discussion
of how to construct such an index. In addition to taxes and expenditures, the dependent variable
BUDGET is the tax revenues and primary spending to GDP (TAX/GDP and EXP/GDP) when
hypotheses three and four are tested, and the effective labor tax in percent of the effective capital
income tax (henceforth LABCAP) and the effective consumption tax in percent of the effective
capital income tax (henceforth CONCAP) when testing hypotheses 5 and 6. The rest of the
included variables and subscripts are as outlined for EQ.1.
The construction of Icap, as explained in the next section, is such that zero is the maximum value
it takes and zero and stands for perfect capital mobility, while the further below zero the value of
Icap, the lower the degree of capital mobility, or in other words, when Icap increases it means
that capital mobility increases. The parameter estimate for the pure debt service term in EQ 2
therefore measures the effect of debt service on the dependent variable under perfect capital
mobility, while the interaction term measures the change in the effect of debt service when capital
mobility increases (i.e. the change in the effect of debt service per unit of Icap). Support for
hypotheses 3 and 4 would therefore require that the interaction term have the opposite sign of the
debt service term for taxes and the same sign as the debt service term for expenditures. When
hypotheses 5 and 6 are considered, only the interaction term is relevant and confirms the
hypotheses if found to be positive. Finally, it should be mentioned that when the effective tax
ratios are the dependent variable, the debt service term alone is expected to be positive in the tax
                                                
14 Including the "raw" capital mobility index is important even though the direct effect is not the focus of this study,
because it might be correlated with the interaction of capital mobility and debt service, and hence, excluding it might
provide for an omitted variables bias of the parameter estimate of the interaction term.	
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competition model allowing for labor taxation (since all taxes, including the ones induced by
increasing debt servicing, will be put on the immobile factor).
3. The Data
The sample consists of yearly data for 13 EU member countries (EU15 less Luxembourg and
Finland)
15 from 1970 to 1999. The panel is unbalanced due to cross-country differences in data
availability, and the average number of years of data per country is 24. Most data are from the
OECD economic outlook database, with some exceptions. Definitions and precise sources of the
data are given in appendix.
Three types of data needed for the empirical analysis are not straightforward and deserve further
comments: how to measure debt service, how to measure capital mobility and how to measure
effective tax rates on capital, labor and consumption. Attention is devoted to these three
categories of data below.
Measures of Debt Service
In a world similar to that of the tax competition model outlined above, with no tomorrow and
hence no growth, the measure is the pure nominal interest payments on the public debt:
t t b r DS ⋅ ≡ 1
where b is the debt to GDP and r is the average nominal interest rate on government debt. But the
government budget constraint is significantly affected by growth, and allowing for GDP growth
makes the choice of how to measure debt service less clear. An alternative measure of debt
service, which is similar to the measure proposed by Roubini and Sachs (1989a) and used in
several studies after that, is given by the intertemporal budget constraint
16:
t t t b r DS ⋅ − ≡ ) ( 2 σ
Using the DS2 measure of debt service implicitly assumes that policy responds to the level of the
primary balance, tt - gt, needed to keep the debt to GDP ratio unchanged. If growth increases, it
gives the same leeway in the budget as if the interest rate on the public debt decreases, so a
change in the interest rate on public debt only matters budget wise if the growth rate does not
change in the same way as well. DS1, on the other hand, assumes that the policy response to
changes in growth and the nominal interest payments are not the same, although the two effects
provide the same air in the overall budget. A justification of this could be that pure interest
                                                
15 Luxembourg is not included due to lack of available data. Finland is not included due to only a few years of
available data as well as Finland statistically being an outlier in every regression for these few years.
16 The intertemporal budget constraint is given by  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + ⋅ + − ⋅ + = − t t t t t t b b r g t σ , where t is the tax
revenue to GDP ratio, g is expenditures to GDP, and σ is the nominal GDP growth rate. Making the assumption that
1 + ≅ t t b b , we get  () tt tt t tg r b σ −≅− ⋅ , implying that the measure of debt service which budget policy reacts to is
interest payments net of the growth effect on the level of the debt  Including monetary financing in the budget
constraint would add a term depending on inflation and real growth, but it would not interact with the debt term and
would hence not change the debt service measure coming out of this exercise.	
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payments directly and visibly affect the budget and are predictable, while the effects of growth,
all else equal, is to reduce the debt to GDP ratio. Moreover, the cash effect of pure interest
payments in the budget has a different timing that the growth effect which may also affect the
response of the policy maker.
If DS2 is the correct measure and σt·b t and rt·b t where not correlated, the parameter estimate of
DS2 and DS1 should be the same. However, since σt·b t and rt·b t are positively correlated
17, using
DS1 will be biased toward zero if DS2 is the correct measure. As we will see in the next section,
this does not turn out to be the case for the present panel.
If, on the other hand, DS1 is the correct measure and σt·b t does not have significant explanatory
power, using DS2 in the regression will imply a higher standard error of the parameter estimate.
The results of the analysis in the next section seem to confirm this scenario.
A regression including the interest part and the growth part separately can be used to test whether
DS2 is the right measure of debt service impacting on the budget, by testing whether the
parameter estimate of the interest rate term is equal to minus the estimate of the growth term. The
results of this test are shown and discussed in the next section.
Finally, it is important to clarify that using the lag of these two measures in the regression
equation is what necessitates controlling for the lags of real growth and inflation in order to avoid
omitted variables bias. This is because both measures – and DS2 in particular – are correlated
with real growth and inflation, and because the lags of real growth and inflation both have
significant explanatory power in the regressions (for example, the DS2 changes sign when lagged
growth is not included separately).
DS1 and DS2 are defined and calculated as implicit rates as given in appendix, and plotted for the
panel countries in figures 1 to 8. According to the DS1 measure, the countries most burdened by
public debt of the sample are Belgium, Italy and Greece. When using the DS2 measure however,
Greece is no longer among the top 3 debt burdened countries, and Italy only becomes one of the
more debt-burdened countries later in the sample period. Moreover, the Netherlands, Denmark
and Sweden are some of the more debt-burdened countries of the sample when the DS2 measure
is used. This means that Greece and Italy have been able to partly outgrow or inflate away their
public debt service over the period studied, without having to restrict their primary budget too
much.
Measures of Capital Mobility
The degree of capital mobility is not directly observable or measurable, and there is therefore no
obvious index of the degree of capital mobility of European Union countries. There is, however, a
battery of suggested proxies, a non-exhaustive list of which is provided in appendix. A thorough
overview of these measures and what they imply for capital mobility in EU countries is carried
out in Krogstrup (2002), in which an empirical analysis of the effects of three of these measures
                                                
17 With a correlation coefficient of 0.74 in the EU14 panel from 1973 to 1999.	
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on taxes and expenditures in EU member countries is carried out. For reasons of data availability
and because it provides a continuous measure, covered interest differentials is the only measure of
the three which has credibly and accurately enough measures the degree of capital mobility.
Moreover, it is the only measure providing intuitive and significant results. Covered interest
parity differentials are hence used as measure of capital mobility in this study. Lemmen and
Eijjfinger (1996) argue that if covered interest parity is not fulfilled between two countries, it
must be because capital cannot flow freely to equalize this differential, and hence, capital cannot
be perfectly mobile. The higher the divergence from covered interest parity, the greater the
incentive to move capital and hence, the less capital can be mobile since it is not responding to
this incentive. In line with Lemmen and Eijjfinger, the absolute value of the covered interest
parity differential on 3 month interbank deposits (henceforth the CIP) are calculated for EU
member country currencies vis-à-vis the German mark, using the formula
33 3
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where 3monthrate is the 3 month interbank deposit interest rate for country i, 3mforward is the 3
month forward exchange rate and spot is the spot exchange rate vis-à-vis the Deutschmark. Data
from Datastream and OECD Main Economic Indicators are used. Monthly averages were used
since the longest series available for inter-bank deposit rates where provided by OECD Main
Economic Indicators in monthly averages. Ideally, data observed on the same day of the month
and even at the same time of the day would be preferable, since these are the prices observed by
traders. End of month measures of inter-bank deposit rates and exchange rates are available with
Datastream, but in substantially shorter series. Hence, the additional source of inaccuracy of using
averages has been chosen over the loss of degrees of freedom associated with the use of end of
month measures. Using monthly averages still provides an overall estimate of monthly averages
of differentials from interest parity, and Lemmen and Eijffinger (1996) use monthly averages for
the same reasons. The sample only extends until the end of 1998, after which national currencies
no longer exists for most of the countries and hence cannot be used as tools to differentiate the
CIPs between countries. Descriptive statistics for the calculated CIPs are shown in table 2.
Graphs of the CIPs over time per country are shown in figures 9-13 and show a very clear picture
of increasing capital mobility over the entire period and strongest in the late 1980s - early 1990s
in all EU countries. Due to the short sample for Greece, this country is excluded from the panel
when the CIP is included in the regressions. The value of the CIP for Germany is set to zero by
assumption
18, and the robustness of results to the exclusion of Germany is tested.
Measures of Average Effective Tax Rates
The average effective tax rate (AETR) on labor, capital and consumption are not observable, and
therefore have to be estimated from the tax statistics available. The literature proposes several
                                                
18 Using Germany and not a third country (e.g. the US) as base country rests on the hypothesis that Germany had
close to free capital movements for the entire period. This hypothesis is supported by the Quinn’s 14-point index for
Germany. Quinn’s 14 point index only takes the values 13 or 14 for the entire period for Germany, implying that
Germany had very few capital controls from 1970 to 1997. This is contrary to all other OECD, which have values
between 4 (Portugal) and 12.5 (US, Canada and Switzerland) in 1970, after which the score mostly increases for all
OECD countries. Since Germany is the base country, the series is set to zero for Germany for the entire period.	
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methods for how to calculate AETRs from available revenue and tax statistics
19. The most
influential paper on calculating AETRs is Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), who base the
calculations on the OECD revenue statistics. Carey and Thillinguirian (2000) provide updated
and improved versions of the Mendoza et. al. (1994) effective tax rates, also based on the OECD
revenue statistics
20, and include average effective tax rates for EU15 countries less Luxembourg
from 1980 to 1997. Carey and Thillinguirian’s estimates have been used in this paper due to their
sample length and coverage, and because of the improvements from previous estimates. Table 3
shows descriptive statistics for the average effective tax rates while descriptive statistics for the
ratios of average effective labor and consumption tax rates to the effective capital tax rate are
shown in table 4. Graph 14 shows the EU average effective labor and consumption tax rates in
percent of the EU average effective capital tax rate between 1980 and 1999. Clearly both averages
have been exhibiting an increasing trend over the last 20 years, supporting the frequent claim that
increasing tax competition in the European Union has been switching the tax burden from capital
to labor and consumption.
4: The Estimation Results
The Basic Specification
When testing the panel specification using the DS1 measure against the hypothesis that country
regressions should not be pooled and are unrelated to each other, the pooling hypothesis is
accepted. However, when the alternative hypothesis is that country equations should be estimated
as seemingly unrelated regressions, thus allowing for cross-country correlation of the error terms,
the hypothesis is rejected. When testing whether the restriction that the debt service term is equal
across countries in an otherwise seemingly unrelated regression specification, the hypothesis is
accepted when Spain and Portugal are not included in the tax regression, and when Denmark and
Greece are not included in the expenditure regression. Due to the limited availability of country-
specific data, the panel specification is kept and the simultaneous exclusion of Spain and Portugal
from the tax regression and Denmark and Greece from the expenditure regression respectively
from the sample is tested in the robustness analysis.
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions of EQ.1 (henceforth called the basic specification) for
the tax revenues to GDP ratio and primary expenditures to GDP ratio. In line with the empirical
literature on determinants of the budget and the results of the Hausman test for fixed versus
random effects (see table 5), the regressions are carried out with fixed effects
21. The panel
regressions for the tax ratio and the ratio of primary expenditures to GDP are estimated using
FGLS, thus accounting for contemporaneous correlation as well as cross sectional
heteroscedasticity. The two panel regressions are estimated in a system as two seemingly
unrelated regressions, to increase efficiency in the presence of cross equation correlation of the
disturbance terms.
                                                
19 Mostly, a method is provided for categorizing different types of taxes into either the capital tax category, the labor
tax category or the consumption tax category, as well as a way of defining the tax base to divide the categorized
revenue with. These types of measures of AETRs are also called implicit tax rates.
20 The data on average effective tax rates was kindly made available by David Carey.




A regression including the interest part and the growth part separately can be used to test whether
DS2 is the measure of debt service inducing policy responses, by testing whether the parameter
estimate of the interest rate term is equal to minus the estimate of the growth term. The results of
this test are shown in the last row of table 5. The restriction is rejected, suggesting that DS2 is not
the measure of debt service to which budgetary policy reacts. Moreover, the parameter estimates
for DS2 are smaller in absolute value than the parameter estimates for DS1, which is the opposite
of what should be expected if DS2 were the right measure. When testing the significance of σt·b t
in the regression including DS1, the parameter estimate is not statistically different from zero in
the expenditures regression, while slightly positive in the tax regression. The inclusion does not
change the parameter value of DS1 for either taxes or expenditures. The interaction of growth and
debt is therefore left out entirely from the DS1 regression and the six hypotheses are tested only
for DS1 in the following
22.
Parameter estimates of other included variables
Parameter estimates of the regressions are for the most part in line with the previous literature on
the determinants of fiscal policy. The lagged change in the debt to GDP ratio is insignificant in
both regressions, implying either the lack of stabilizing reaction to changes in the debt or that the
change in the debt is an imperfect measure of stabilization effort. The change in the
unemployment ratio is significant and positively determining the change in primary
expenditures
23, presumably capturing counter-cyclical expenditure policy. The change in
unemployment is on the other hand insignificant in the tax regressions, possibly reflecting that
counter-cyclical policy is not as strongly influencing the revenue side as the expenditure side of
the budget. Both contemporaneous and lagged changes in real growth are highly significant and
negative in both regressions, as is to be expected if nominal budgets are sticky
24. The parameter
estimates for inflation are significant and positive in both regressions except contemporaneous
inflation in the tax regression, which is insignificant
25. This positive effect of inflation on tax
revenue is to be expected when tax brackets are nominal and sticky while the positive effect on
expenditures may be capturing the positive effect of monetary financing on the budget, or the
effect of indexation of certain expenditure items. The dummy for the Maastricht years is
significant and does indeed indicate a more restrained expenditure policy after the ratification of
the Maastricht treaty. Tax policy, however, does not seem to have been affected by the ratification
of the Maastricht treaty.
                                                
22 In order to check whether the statistical rejection of DS2 term as the appropriate debt service measure is due to the
increasing fiscal restraint after 1992, an interaction term between the Maastricht dummy and the debt service measure
is included in the regressions. Table 6 shows the results. Clearly the added interaction term is not significant in any
regression and the parameter estimates for the debt service terms do not change much. The Maastricht dummy
interaction term is therefore left out and it is concluded that the DS1 measures is the empirically relevant measure of
debt service which policy makers respond to.
23 with a slightly lower parameter estimate, around 0.35, than that found in de Haan and Sturm (1993)
24 The contemporaneous parameter estimates for the tax regressions are very similar to those found in Volkerink and
de Haan (1999), and the ones of the expenditure regressions are in line with the findings of de Haan and Sturm
(1993)
25 This is in line with the findings of Perotti and Kontopoulos (1998) except for the estimated contemporaneous effect




How Does Debt Servicing Affect Taxes and Expenditures (H1 and H2)?
The regression results confirm hypotheses one and two, by showing that a one percentage point
increase in the debt service to GDP ratio results in a 0.20 percentage point increase in the tax
revenue to GDP ratio and a 0.37 percentage point fall in the primary expenditures to GDP ratio
the following year. Since the sum of the two parameter estimates is below one, the change in debt
service is not fully adjusted to in the budget the following year.
Considering the robustness of these results, the DW statistic is slightly high for the expenditures
regression
26. When the ratio of over 65 year old to the total population is included in the
regression (see the first two columns of table 8) the DW statistic falls substantially, indicating a
better fit when this variable is included. The inclusion does not have a substantial effect on the
size of the parameter estimate for debt service though, so the basic specification is kept. Table 6
shows that the parameter estimates do not change substantially when an interaction term between
the Maastricht dummy and debt service is included, and moreover, the interaction term is not
significant, implying that the effect of debt service on the two sides of the budget did not change
in response to the increasing fiscal restraint advocated by the Maastricht treaty. Table 7 shows
that the parameter estimates of DS1 are not driven by a single country, although the size vary
somewhat according to which country is excluded. When Denmark and Greece are excluded from
the expenditure regression, and when Spain and Portugal are excluded from the tax regression
respectively, the parameter estimates become substantially larger and standard errors fall,
confirming the findings of the tests for pooling of the data. Table 8 shows the tax and expenditure
regressions including the participation ratio, the ratio of the population over 65 to the active
population and the degree of openness of the economy, as well as when political variables - the
contemporaneous and lagged value of a dummy for election years and the ideology of the
government in power. The inclusion of these variables does not change the conclusions, but some
of the parameter estimates are interesting in themselves. For example, the contemporary and
lagged dummy for the election year show a clear election cycle in the tax regressions, with a fall
in taxes before the election and an increase in taxes during or after the election
27. The significant
parameter estimates of debt service could be suspected to be capturing direct effects of changes in
interest rates on the budget. To make sure this is not the case, table 9 shows results for the
regression including the first difference of the long or short-term interest rate. Table 10 shows the
results when the specifications is changed to include inflation and growth in levels instead of first
differences, which may be a preferable specification since unit roots are not likely in the levels of
these two variables. This change in specification does not change the conclusions
28. Including
                                                
26 The DW test statistics may or may not be significant. The significance cannot be evaluated using the usual DW
tables when estimating a fixed effect panel regression. Bhargave et al. (1982) provide 5 percent significance points
for the DW statistic in fixed effects panel regressions, but do not provide these for the panel dimensions of this
analysis. Whether the size of the DW statistics are anything to worry about hence has to be judged by the naked eye.
27 This is in line with the results of empirical political business cycle tests for 18 OECD countries in Galeotti and
Salford (2001). But not all empirical investigations of election cycles in taxes and expenditures find supporting
evidence. Alesina et al. (1997) only find the level of public debt to show clear election cycles while taxes and
expenditures do not show election cycles, also for a panel of 18 OECD countries. Shi and Svensson (2001), on the
other hand, find election cycles in both taxes and expenditures for a panel of 123 countries.
28 Table 11 shows the results when the entire regression is estimated in levels including the lagged dependent variable
and a linear country specific time trend to make the regression comparable to the one in first differences. The
parameter estimate of DS1 in the primary expenditures regression is now insignificant. However, the parameter	
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only the first lag of the debt service variable and implicitly assuming that the time from a change
in debt service is observed to a policy reaction is implemented is one year is rather arbitrary, and
is adopted from the specifications of the previous literature on budgetary determinants
29. Table 10
shows the regression results for the basic specification augmented with 2 more lags of the debt
service variables
30. The tax regression shows that the parameter estimate of the first lag is robust
to the inclusion of the extra lags, while the extra lags are insignificant. The first lag of debt
service in the expenditure regression does not change substantially either, but the additional lags
of the DS1 measure are significantly negative. This indicates that expenditures’ reaction to
changes in debt service takes longer time, and may be greater than indicated by the regression
results of the basic specification. Interestingly, the sum of the parameter estimates for the tree lags
of DS1 in the expenditure regression can be statistically accepted to be equal to minus one, while
the sum of the parameter estimates of the lags in the tax equation can be statistically accepted to
equal to zero. Hence, the effect of debt service on taxes and expenditures may have a more
complicated dynamic structure than that captured in the basic specification including one lag,
since several additional lags are significant at least in the expenditures regression
31.
To sum up for the results for the first two hypotheses, the data supports hypothesis one since a
one percentage point increase in the debt service to GDP ratio leads to an average increase in the
tax revenue to GDP ratio of 0.20 percentage points the year after, or between 0 to 0.35 percentage
points depending on specification. The data also supports hypothesis two, and the size of the
absolute impact on expenditures from changes in debt service is 0.37, or between -0.20 and –1.00
depending on specification. The lower limit of 0 for taxes and –1.00 for expenditures come from
taking a 3 year horizon and testing the restriction that changes in debt service are entirely
absorbed by opposite changes in primary expenditures and taxes are not affected at all, which
                                                                                                                                                             
estimate of DS1 is significantly negative in the expenditures regression in levels regression estimated to test
hypotheses 3 and 4, and given the problems of including the lagged dependent variable in a fixed effects panel
regression, and potential problems of non-stationarity, these results will not be emphasized.
NB: Including the lagged dependent in a fixed effects regression is a potential source of bias due to the correlation of
the lagged dependent and the fixed effects. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998), estimating their regression in levels as
part of their robustness analysis, argue that since the sample of countries is conceptually fixed (in their case, OECD
countries, in the present case, EU countries), and hence the asymptotics are based on T going to infinity, the estimator
is consistent even though the lagged dependent variable is included. But since the sample length of the panel is far
from going to infinity, although it is not short, it cannot be ruled out that the potential is substantial, and caution
should hence be taken in interpreting the results of the regression in levels. Conclusions from the levels specification
are hence not included directly in the robustness analysis, but the results are shown to allow comparisons.
29 The time it takes from a change in debt service to hit taxes or expenditures can be conceptually divided into two
components. First, the implementation lag, which is the time it takes from a statutory change in a tax rate or planned
expenditure to translate into a change in tax revenues or actual expenditures. The second component is the time it
takes from the change in debt service takes place till this is realized and initiative it taken to make room for it in the
budget. One can only guess at how long this latter component might be in terms of time, and since forecasting may
work rather well in this area, this part of the time lag might even be negative.
30 The true lag length may be country specific and determining this true lag length would necessitate looking at the
formal budgetary process of each individual country, which is beyond the scope of the this investigation.
Alternatively, one can test for how many lags to include statistically by applying a battery of tests for this purpose. A
lag length of 2 is chosen without the backing of such tests since performing these tests does not give a clear answer as
to how many lags to include, each of the tests suggesting a different number of lag length ranging from zero to 6.
31 A way of exploring the dynamic relationship in more detail would be to allow the short term dynamics to be
country specific while restricting the long run relationship to be identical across countries using the pooled mean
group estimator of dynamic heterogenous panels suggested by Pesaran et al (1997).	
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cannot be rejected. This implies that debt service may be decreasing the size of the public sector
rather than increases the tax level in the medium term. Exploring the dynamic relationship in
more detail is left for future research
32.
According to calculations based on the estimated effect of lagged debt service on overall taxes
and primary expenditures of EU countries (see table 12), Greece was the country most affected by
debt service obligations in 1999, with an estimated 4.9 % relative tax increase and 8.7% relative
fall in primary expenditures due to debt service. In comparison, the United Kingdom was
estimated to have had 1.5% higher taxes and 2.8% lower expenditures due to debt service during
that year. Hence, cross country differences in the level of debt may be an important source of
asymmetry in public finances and the size of the public sector across EU countries.
How Does Capital Mobility Change the Effect of Debt Servicing on the Budget (H3
and H4)?
Hypotheses 3 and 4, concerning the change of the effect of debt service on taxes and expenditures
of increasing capital mobility, are tested by estimating EQ.2 for taxes and primary expenditures.
The regressions are carried out with fixed effects, and the estimation procedure is the same as
above. Greece has been excluded from the sample due to the few available observations of the
CIP
33. Table 7 shows that excluding Greece does not change the regression of EQ.1 substantially,
making it less likely to have an influence in EQ.2. Using the CIP substantially lowers the number
of observations of the regressions. This shorter time dimension should be kept in mind when
comparing the results of the parameter estimates of the regressions with and without the CIP. In
general, the parameter estimates have slightly higher standard errors, which may be due both to
the shorter sample, as well as to the slight increase in multicollinearity introduced by the
inclusion of the two capital mobility terms.
Table 13 shows the results of the specification including CIP and the interaction between CIP and
debt service, EQ.2. CIP is multiplied by minus one before being included in the regression, such
that an increase in the CIP means an increase in capital mobility, to render interpretation of the
parameter estimates more intuitive. The parameter estimates of the none-CIP terms stay more or
less the same, the exception being the change in the unemployment rate, which becomes highly
significant and negative in the tax regression when the capital mobility terms are included. It is
interesting to notice that the direct effect of capital mobility on taxes is found to be negative, as
expected, but the effect is not found to be significant. Moreover, capital mobility is found to have
a significant positive impact on expenditures, which is the opposite of the general predictions of
the tax competition literature
34. Although these findings do not have direct implications for the
hypotheses tested in the present paper, the fact that linked predictions of the model are not
empirically supported implies that the model is not consistently empirically supported. This
should be kept in mind when the results for hypotheses 3 and 4 are interpreted.
                                                
32 See previous footnote.
33 Greece could also be excluded on grounds that the country is an outlier in terms of the CIP. See figure 10 in
appendix.
34 This result would, on the other hand, support the hypothesis tested in Garreth and Mitchell (2001), stating that the
higher is capital mobility, the higher is the need for social insurance against the induced increased volatility in
economic activity, and the higher should public current spending be expected to be.	
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Concerning the hypotheses three and four, the parameter estimates of the interaction terms show
that the hypothesis that increased capital mobility should result in a smaller effect of debt
servicing cost on taxes is not supported by the data. However, capital mobility is found to
increases the downward pressure of debt service on primary expenditures. The effect of a one
percentage point increase in the DS1 under perfect capital mobility (i.e. when CIP=0) is to reduce
primary expenditures ratio with 0.26 percentage points, and this impact is 0.09 percentage points
smaller in absolute value for every percentage point decrease of the CIP below zero.
Concerning the robustness of these results, there are signs of negative autocorrelation in the
expenditure regression and positive autocorrelation in the tax regression according to the DW
statistic, but autocorrelation is not a problem when time and the interest rate are included as
explanatory variables (see regression results in table 15). Both are significant in each regression,
but their inclusion does not change the relevant parameter estimates considerably. The original
specification is hence kept in spite of the autocorrelation. Table 15 shows that the parameter
estimates of the interaction terms are robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables, which
could be suspected to be correlated with capital mobility. Table 14 shows that when Denmark or
Spain is excluded from the panel, the standard error of the parameter estimates of the interaction
term increase somewhat, but the parameter estimate for expenditures stays significant on the 10%
level. Moreover, when Spain is dropped from the panel, the parameter estimate of the interaction
term for taxes becomes significantly negative. Table 15 shows that the conclusions are robust to
the inclusion of growth and inflation in levels instead of first differences.
To sum up, the effect of debt service on taxes is not found to change when capital mobility is
higher, so hypothesis 3 is not supported by the data. There does, however, seem to be an effect of
changes in the CIP on the impact of debt service on expenditures, lending support to hypothesis
four. For each percentage point narrowing of the CIP, the negative effect of debt service on
expenditures is estimated to be 0.09 percentage points higher, but the parameter estimate is
somewhat dependent on changes in the sample. Caution should be shown in interpreting this
finding, since capital mobility was not found to have any direct effect on taxes and a positive
effect on expenditures.
Does Capital Mobility Shift the Tax Burden of Debt Service from Capital to Labor
and Consumption (H5 and H6)?
EQ.2 is estimated for the effective labor and effective consumption to capital tax ratios to test
hypothesis 5 and 6 concerning the effect of capital mobility on the relative importance of capital,
labor and consumption taxes in the tax burden of debt servicing costs. As above, the regressions
are carried out with fixed effects in a system using FGLS and Greece is excluded from the panel.
Table 17 shows the results of the regressions.
The parameter estimates of unemployment and current and lagged growth are significantly
positive while the current parameter estimate of inflation is negative and significant in both
regressions. The lagged change in the debt level is positive and significant on the 10% level in
explaining changes in the effective consumption to capital tax ratio while this is not significant	
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for the effective labor to capital ratio. The Maastricht year dummy and lagged inflation are not
significant in either regression. As discussed in section 2, the basic tax competition model
without debt service predicts that capital mobility in itself puts a downward pressure on capital
taxation relative to labor and consumption taxation, and the expected parameter estimate of the
CIP terms in the regressions of the two effective tax ratios should therefore be positive. The
opposite turns out to be the case, as in the CIP-regressions for taxes and expenditures above, in
that the CIP is found to have a negative effect on the consumption to capital effective tax ratio
while it does not significantly affect the labor to capital effective tax ratio, and the same cautions
in interpreting the results as above hence apply here.
Concerning the effect of debt service on the effective tax ratios and how this effect depends on
the degree of capital mobility, remember that the parameter estimate for the pure debt service
term gives the effect of debt service for a situation when capital mobility is perfect (i.e. when the
covered interest differential is zero) while the parameter estimate for the interaction term between
debt service and capital mobility gives the increase in the impact of debt service for each
percentage point increase in the CIP away from zero. Debt servicing is found to be insignificant
under perfect capital mobility in both tax ratio regressions, implying that a potential effect of debt
servicing on taxes is distributed equally between the different tax bases when capital is perfectly
mobile. At the same time, the significant and positive parameter estimate of the interaction term
in both regressions mean that when capital mobility increases, the effect of debt service on the
labor to capital tax ratio and on the consumption to capital tax ratio increases. Strictly speaking,
this would imply that under imperfect capital mobility, debt service mostly results in capital
income taxation, and when capital mobility increases, the effect of debt servicing will shift
toward the less mobile factors, while under perfect capital mobility, the impact of debt service is
the same for labor and capital income taxation. Hypothesis 5 is therefore, strictly speaking,
supported by the data, as a one percentage point narrowing of the CIP results in a 0.43 percentage
point increase in the effective labor to capital tax ratio per percentage point debt service. The
corresponding number for the effective consumption to capital tax ratio is 0.32 percentage points.
But the finding that the impact goes from a high tax burden on capital to a more equal split is not
in line with the predictions of the tax competition model, that none of the tax burden of debt
servicing will be put on capital when capital is perfectly mobile. One reason may be that there are
many factors other than tax base mobility influencing the setting of tax rates.
Concerning robustness, both regressions show signs of positive autocorrelation, and the DW test
statistic does not decrease when other explanatory variables are included (table 19), nor does it
fall when using levels of the CIP (not shown). The relatively high value of the DW statistic may
be a sign of misspecification or a result of poor data quality, but the basic specification is kept in
lack of a better alternative. Table 18 shows that when Belgium is dropped from the panel, the
standard error or the parameter estimate of the interaction term increases and leaves the parameter
estimate significant only on the 10% level for the effective labor to capital tax ratio. Apart from
this, the parameter estimates of the interaction terms are rather robust to changes in the countries
included in the regression, to the inclusion of time and the interest rate as explanatory variables
(table 19), and to including the growth and inflation terms in levels (table 19).	
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To sum up for hypotheses 5 and 6, the data support these in a strict sense. Capital mobility is
found to shift the debt service burden away from capital taxation and toward labor and
consumption taxation. The impact on the effect of debt service on the effective labor to capital tax
ratio is 0.43 percentage points per percentage point narrowing of the CIP, but varies between 0.33
and 0.69 depending on which countries are included in the sample. The estimated impact on the
effect of debt service on the effective consumption to capital tax ratio is 0.32 percentage points
per percentage point narrowing of the CIP, and this estimate varies between 0.22 and 0.36
depending on the countries included in the sample. However, the data do not support other
predictions of the theoretical model, and thus, caution should be made in interpreting the above
results.
Table 21 shows the average estimated effect on the labor and consumption to capital tax ratios of
the change in capital mobility and the average debt service over the years 1985 to 1999 for EU
countries, implied by the parameter estimates. The tax mix of Portugal was estimated to have
been most affected by the increase in capital mobility combined with the existence of debt service
obligations. As such, the effective labor (consumption) tax in percent of the effective capital tax
was estimated to have increased by 6.3 %-points (4.6%-points) between 1985 and 1999 due to
increased capital mobility and debt service. In comparison, the numbers for the UK were 0.01%
for both tax ratios.
Conclusions
According to a simple model of tax competition augmented with public debt and representing the
steady state, high and differing levels of debt service across EU countries may lead to cross
country differences in public finances, since debt service has to be financed from the overall
budget. Six theoretical hypotheses about the effects of the associated debt service on overall
taxes, primary expenditures and the tax mix, are derived and empirically tested for a panel of 13
EU countries (EU15 less Luxembourg and Finland).
The data supported the hypotheses that taxes are higher and primary spending is lower in high-
debt EU countries compared to low-debt EU countries in the short run, all else equal. Thus, cross
country differences in the level of debt were found to be an important source of asymmetry in
public finances and the size of the public sector across EU countries. When a three year horizon
was considered instead of one years horizon, the restriction that lagged changes in debt service
lead to a one to one fall in primary expenditures while leaving the overall tax level unchanged
could not be rejected.
The theoretical model also predicted that changing the degree of capital mobility has an effect on
the impact of debt service on taxes and expenditures. Since tax induced distortions increase with
the degree of capital mobility, debt service should increasingly results in lower expenditures of
high-debt countries compared to low debt countries, and decreasingly results in higher taxes in
high-debt countries compared to low-debt countries. This hypothesis was only partly supported by
the data. The effect of debt service on taxes was found to be unchanged by the degree of capital
mobility, while the data did indicate that the negative effect on primary expenditures of debt
service is greater when capital mobility is higher. Hence, increasing capital mobility may result in	
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increasing asymmetry among EU countries regarding the size of their public sectors. The partial
rejection of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model may be due to capital mobility and
debt service affecting the budget balance rather than on the two sides of the budget. The
theoretical model would not capture this due to the balanced budget assumption. The finding that
expenditures react more to lagged changes in debt services when capital mobility is high and that
expenditures change one to one with debt service in the medium term, may indicate that
increasing capital mobility and tax competition leads to faster adjustment to budget balance rather
than to a downward pressure on tax rates.
The theoretical model augmented with an immobile tax base predicted that debt service will
increasingly be paid by taxes on the immobile factor rather than on capital when capital mobility
increases. This hypothesis was supported by the data, although not very robustly so. Assuming
that labor income and consumption are immobile tax bases, the effect of debt service on the
effective labor tax as well as the effective consumption tax in percent of the effective capital tax
increased with the degree of capital mobility. Increases in capital mobility were found to shift the
tax burden of debt servicing from capital income and toward labor income and consumption,
confirming a marginal tendency for capital mobility to shift the tax burden of debt servicing
toward less mobile tax bases.
A caveat concerning the consistency of the estimated effects of capital mobility is in line here.
The direct effects of capital mobility on taxes, expenditures and the tax mix, which where not in
focus in this investigation but nevertheless were part of the implications of the theoretical model,
were not supported by the data. This implies that the theoretical model was not supported entirely
and this inconsistency of the empirical results should be kept in mind when the above conclusions
about the effect of capital mobility are considered.
To sum up, public debt was found to lead to asymmetries in the levels of taxes and primary
expenditures across EU countries, with high debt countries having smaller public sectors and
higher taxes, at least in the short run, than low debt countries, all else equal. Moreover, the data
did not reject the hypotheses that capital mobility may increase these asymmetries while also
triggering cross-country asymmetries in the tax mix of EU countries. Thus, when capital mobility
increases, the tax increases made necessary by higher debt-service obligations may fall
increasingly on labor income and consumption rather than on capital. These finding have several
implications. First, high-debt EU countries may be suffering from higher tax induced distortions
to their economy compared to the lower-debt counterparts. Second, high debt levels in some EU
countries, may, all else equal, have provided a mitigating effect on the tendency of the public
sector (measured as primary expenditures) to grow in these countries, since debt servicing is
found to mainly crowd out primary expenditures.
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Data, Sources and Definitions
The data used in the empirical analysis are described below and are from OECD Economic
Outlook unless other sources are given in the table below. The overall sample size is 1972 to
1999. Some series start later or end earlier. The countries included in the sample are the EU15
less Luxembourg and Finland (due to poor availability of data for these countries). The
construction of the index of ideology and the index of degree of capital mobility are described in
more detail below.
Variable Definition and Sources
TAX/GD
P
Total tax revenues in percent of GDP
EXP/GDP Primary expenditures in percent of GDP
BY First difference of the debt to GDP ratio (Nominal gross debt and nominal gross
domestic product).
DS1 Gross interest payments on public debt in percent of GDP
DS2 The average nominal interest on government debt less the nominal growth rate times
the debt to GDP ratio. The average interest on government debt is approximated by
the gross interest payment on public debt divided by the gross debt.
UB Unemployment rate
GR The first difference of the real growth rate, calculated using data on nominal GDP
and the GDP deflator
INFL The yearly percentage change in the consumer price index
MAAS Dummy for the Maastricht years, taking the value 1 from 1993 onwards.
PART The participation rate, constructed as labor force in percent of the population
between the age of 15 and 65. (Data for Portugal are from the Ameco database.
Otherwise, the source is OECD Economic Outlook)
OLD The population over the age of 65 in percent of the total population. (Data for
Portugal are from the Ameco database. Otherwise, the source is OECD Economic
Outlook)
OPEN Imports plus exports in percent of GDP.
EYEAR Dummy taking the value 1 in years of parliamentary elections of the given country,
and zero otherwise. Source: Parties and Elections in Europe: http://www.parties-and-
elections.de/
IDEO Dummy for the ideology of the government in power. Construction as explained
below. Source: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000
LABCAP The average effective tax rate on labor in percent of the average effective capital
income tax. Source: Carey and Thilinguirian 2000.
CONCAP The average effective tax rate on consumption in percent of that of the average
effective capital income tax. Source: Carey and Thilinguirian 2000.




Construction of an index of ideology
In line with the empirical literature on the effects of ideology on fiscal policy
35, data provided by
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000 on ideology of the government in power is used. They
provide a classification of the ideology of government by breaking it down to five cases:
1.  Right wing parties dominate both government and parliament.
2.  Right wing or center parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of government
3.  Center parties make up more than 50% of government
4.  Left wing or center parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of government
5.  Left wing parties dominate government
Woldendorp et al 2000 describes how the distinction has been made between right wing, center
and left wing parties. On the basis of this data series, two dummies have been constructed. The
right wing dummy (RIGHT) takes the value one in case 1 and 2 while the left wing dummy
(LEFT) takes the value one in case 4 and 5. These dummies correspond to the dummies right and
left constructed in Volkerink and de Haan 1999.
Covered Interest Parity Differentials (CIP), calculated as laid out in the above section..
Measures of capital mobility
Introduction
Just as there is no perfect, but several imperfect, measures of the tax burden on capital, there is no
straightforward measure of the degree of capital mobility, but there is a battery of suggested
proxies. Approaches to constructing empirical measures of capital mobility can be split into 4
different categories: The legal/formal approach; the volume approach; the price approach; and the
macro approach. Each type of measure, what it has to say about the degree of capital mobility in
the European Union over the past few decades and whether the measure is appropriate to use in
the panel regression analysis is discussed in this section.
The legal/formal approach
The degree to which capital flows freely across national borders is influenced, if not entirely
determined by, the legal framework governing financial transactions between residents and non-
residents of a country. National financial regulation can therefore be coded into an index of the
restrictions to the free movement of capital mobility. The simplest way of creating an index of
capital mobility based on the legal/formal framework is to create a dummy taking the value one if
some type of restriction of cross border financial transactions is in state in the respective country,
and zero otherwise. Alesina et al (1994), among other studies
36, construct four dummies on the
basis of information from the Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions of the IMF, each dummy
taking the value of one if there are restrictions in one of the four following areas of financial cross
border transactions: the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account
transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions and requirements of surrender of export
                                                
35 See for example Volkerink and de Haan (1999) and (2000b)
36 A non-exhaustive list of studies using discrete legal measure of capital mobility is Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995),
Rose (1994), Epstein and Schor (1992), and Garrett (1995).	
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proceeds. The dummies can both be used separately or a weighted average of the four dummies
could be used as a capital mobility index.
Quinn (1997) proposes a more sophisticated measure of capital mobility based on the
legal/formal framework governing international capital transactions, also based on information on
financial regulation from the above mentioned IMF publication. Quinn’s 14 point index is
constructed using a scoring system to translate restrictions on not only outward but also inward
capital account transactions, outward and inward current account transactions, and finally, the
existence of agreements limiting the future use of capital controls, into a quantitative measure
ranging from 0 (financially closed) to 14 (financially fully open). Quinn proposes using the first
difference of the 14-point index as a measure of financial liberalization.
Perhaps the most important drawback of the legal/formal approach to measuring capital mobility
is its discrete nature, since the sheer presence of restrictions does not necessarily convey any
information about the magnitude of the actual impact of the restriction on capital flows. Non-
legal restrictions of cross border capital flows, such as transaction costs or institutional barriers,
may also have significant influence the degree of capital mobility
37.
The volume approach:
Another measure of the degree of capital mobility widely used in the literature is the volume of
gross cross border stocks or flows of either portfolio capital, foreign direct investment flows or
both, and rests on the assumption that increases in capital mobility, and rests on the assumption
that increases in the mobility of capital results in increasing flows of cross border investment.
Both stocks and flows of cross border investment have been used in the literature as measures of
capital mobility
38. Which of the two measures is the conceptually more consistent one to use as a
proxy for capital mobility depends on whether a certain degree of capital mobility corresponds to
an equilibrium level of gross stock or gross flow of foreign investment. Arguably, if two countries
with different returns to investment and zero capital mobility between them open up to capital
flows, capital would flow until the returns to capital were equalized, after which there would be
no more incentive for capital flows. Hence, a certain stock of foreign investment would
correspond to a certain degree of capital mobility in equilibrium, which implies that stocks would
be the more correct measure of the degree of capital mobility. New estimates of stocks of FDI and
portfolio equity investment positions carried out by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001)
There are several drawbacks in using this approach to measuring capital mobility. As mentioned
above, the volume approach to measuring capital mobility rests on the assumption that increases
in the mobility of capital results in actual cross border capital flows. This assumption is a weak
point, as investment decisions do not necessarily respond to increases in the mobility of capital if
there are no price incentives to respond to, and vise versa, capital may flow across borders if price
differentials become high enough, even when the cost of the cross border transaction has not
                                                
37 See Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) for a more thorough discussion of drawbacks of the simple dummy approach.
38 Obstfeld and Taylor (2001) look at cross border stocks of FDI and portfolio investment as an indicator of capital
mobility, while Garreth and Mitchell (2001) and Swank (1998) use FDI and portfolio capital flows.	
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changed. Similarly, it is possible that increases in capital mobility result in changes in asset prices
rather than offsetting capital flows.
The price approach
Covered Interest Parity differentials (CIP)
As mentioned in the paragraph on the dummy approach to measuring capital mobility, using
dummies for the existence of capital restrictions does not sufficiently describe the degree of
capital mobility. Moreover, increased capital mobility may tend to equalize prizes (i.e. interest
rates) rather than producing actual capital flows, as mentioned in the paragraph on the volume
approach. A way of getting around both critiques is to look at the price differential directly. Based
on the assumption that the higher the price differential net of currency risk between two identical
assets of different nationality, the higher restrictions, formal or informal, to capital mobility must
be since price-offsetting flows have not been triggered to take advantage of the arbitrage
opportunity. In other words, in a regime of perfect capital mobility, some sort of interest parity
condition should hold while the lower the degrees of capital mobility is, the higher a differential
from interest parity should be possible without triggering arbitrage activity. The covered interest
parity differential is commonly used for measuring interest parity differentials due to its
implementalibity and availability of data.
Covered Interest Parity differentials:
Covered interest parity (henceforth CIP) is based on the notion that the return on two identical
assets denominated in different currencies should be the same when currency risk is hedged in the
forward market, default risk and liquidity characteristics of the two assets are the same and capital
is perfectly mobile. The differential from CIP can hence be written:
, *








δ δδ ρ =+ − + ⋅
where ρ is the covered interest parity differential at time t with respect to an asset of a maturity of
δ, r is yield of the domestic interest rate, r* is the yield of the foreign asset interest, F is the
forward exchange rate at time t for time t+δ and S is the spot exchange rate at time t, expressed in
domestic currency per foreign currency. The differential can consist of differential default risk of
the two assets, differential liquidity premiums of the two assets, differential transaction costs or
capital controls. It is therefore important to choose assets, which are as similar as possible with
respect to default risk and liquidity in order to minimize the measurement error of the two latter
components of the differential which amount to capital mobility.
Ideally, interest and exchange rate data observed on the same time of day and the same day should
be used to calculate the differential, but collecting such data for a panel of EU countries limits the
sample size substantially compared to using monthly averages of the relevant variables. Since the
availability of data on monthly averages is better and following Lemmen (1996), monthly
averages of data on 3-month inter-bank deposit interest rates, 3-month forward exchange rates
and spot rates from Datastream and OECD Main Economic Indicators are used to calculate CIPs	
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for 14 European Union countries. In the defense of using monthly averages, note that if interest
parity holds for data sampled at the same time in the month, then it should also hold for monthly
averages. On the other hand, a value close to zero of the CIP calculated using monthly averages
does not necessarily imply that interest parity holds for data collected at the same time in the
month, implying that using monthly averages may tend to understate the differentials from
interest parity. This potential for understatement should be kept in mind when analyzing the
estimates.
An alternative to the short-term covered interest differential would be to calculate covered
interest differentials for longer-term assets, as a measure of longer-term capital mobility.
However, to the knowledge of the author, no convincing methodology has as of yet been devised
for calculating such interest differentials
39.
Cross border asset price correlations
Another measure belonging to the category of price measures of capital mobility is cross border
equity price correlations. It can be argued that when the mobility of capital is higher, capital
should respond more easily to market specific changes in risk and return to equity by seeking
other countries with better risk return profiles, all else equal. Hence, equity prices should co-vary
across countries. However, using cross-country equity price correlations as a measure of cross
border capital mobility has many potential pitfalls. Among these are that co-variation may be due
to common shocks rather than capital flows responding to changes in cross border differences in
price or uncertainty driven by country specific events
40. Similar problems are present for cross-
country bond price correlations as a measure of capital mobility.
The macro approach
The macro approach to measuring the degree of capital mobility includes two measures: within-
country savings-investment correlations and cross-country consumption correlations. The former
is used as a measure of capital mobility because the less savings and investment are correlated
within a country, the more access that country must have to international financial markets to
smooth investment, and the higher is the degree of capital mobility. Feldstein and Horioka
(1980), and more recently Hussein (1998) and Lehner (1998), among others used the approach.
The latter measure is used since the higher degree of correlation of consumption across countries,
the more access consumers of each country must have to international financial markets to
smooth consumption and the higher is the degree of capital mobility. Important critiques of the
two measures of capital mobility have been put forth. One such critique is that savings and
investment as well s cross country consumption can be correlated due to common shocks rather
than a lack of financial integration - the same problem with the use of cross country asset price
                                                
39 Popper (1993) provides a methodology for calculating long term interest differentials, but her approach has
conceptual problems which make her methodology unconvincing. Using currency swap rates as well as interest swap
rates, she converts the yield of the foreign currency asset into a domestic currency yield and compares, but she does
not take into account that the same yield may be derived from different coupon/principal profiles of the foreign
currency bond, in turn implying differences in risk profiles, which would make the bonds incomprable.
40 Obstfeld and Taylor (2001) look at equity price correlations to evaluate changes in the degree of international
capital mobility over the last century. They show that changes in correlations do not correspond closely with the
consensus u-shape perception of the degree of capital mobility over the last century. Rather, correlations are likely to
stem from common shocks (which was clearly the case in the 1920s and 1930s) rather than globalization per se.	
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correlations as a measure of financial integration
41. Moreover, the measures are usually calculated
as a single correlation coefficient for a country or for a group of countries, since yearly data is
used. Thus, these measures do not produce a time and country dependent index of capital
mobility, which would be needed in order to use it in a panel regression.
Summary
Four approaches to constructing a measure of the degree of capital mobility have been presented.
First, the legal/formal approach, which looks at whether restrictions to the cross border movement
of capital are formally in state. Second, the volume approach which looks at the volume of cross
border capital transactions as a measure of the degree of capital mobility. Third, the price
approach, based on the notion that capital will move to equate prices across borders if it is free to
do so, and hence uses cross border asset price disparities as an indicator or the degree of capital
mobility. And finally, the macro approach based on the assumption that free access to
international capital markets should result in consumption smoothing and the detachment of
investment and savings within countries and view the lack of the presence of these as evidence of
lack of capital mobility.
A simple model of tax competition with asymmetric public debt levels
Production:
() , 0 , 0 , 0 kk kk k k yf k f f f => < =
where k is the amount of capital invested in domestic production.
The representative citizen owns the production and a certain amount of capital which is invested
either domestically or abroad depending on whether capital is mobile or not, so the private budget
constraint is:
() k xf k f k r k =− ⋅ + ⋅
where  k = the representative citizen’s holdings of capital and r is the after-tax return to capital.
Since there is no tomorrow, the representative citizen will spend all her/his current income on
private consumption, x, hence the equality sign.
The government levies a source unit tax, t, on capital employed in domestic production and uses
the tax revenues to pay debt service and to provide a public good, g, which is produced one to one
from the composite consumption good. The government budget constraint is hence:
rD g k t + = ⋅
The government chooses the tax rate that maximizes the objective function:
                                                
41 See Lemmen (1998) for a discussion of problems with the two macro approaches to measuring capital mobility.	
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under the budget constraint.
The case of zero capital mobility
Under zero capital mobility, the representative citizen can only invest her/his capital in the
domestic production. Capital owned by the representative citizen and capital employed
domestically are therefore the same and the private budget constraint reduces to:
() xf kt k =− ⋅
Hence, domestic course taxation of capital is non-distortionary and the first order condition for
the government’s problem becomes:
1
) , ( ’
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Allowing for perfect capital mobility
When capital is perfectly mobile, the representative citizen may move her/his capital abroad to
attain the world after-tax return to capital if the after-tax return to capital is lower domestically.
The financial market equilibrium condition therefore becomes:
k ft r −=
where r is the world after-tax return to capital, considered fixed by the actors of the model, and fk-
t is the domestic after-tax return to capital.	
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Since an increase in the domestic tax rate will now trigger a capital outflow until the marginal
productivity of capital has increased correspondingly, the source tax on capital is distortionary
and a tax increase will not just increase taxation of the representative citizen one to one, it will
also reduce production, and hence, the marginal cost of increasing public spending in terms of
loss of private net income it larger than one. The first order condition for the solution of the










Totally differentiating the first order condition with respect to debt service yields the total
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In order to compare the size of the two derivatives, evaluate these in the point of symmetric
equilibrium with no debt, such that capital is allocated equally between all countries and the
capital account is neutral (i.e. kk =  in both regimes in equilibrium) when the increase in debt
service occurs. Keep in mind that the tax rate and public spending are lower under perfect than
under zero capital mobility according to the first order conditions, while private net income under
perfect capital mobility is higher than under no capital mobility in symmetric equilibrium.
Assume further that the second derivatives of the utility function are constant in their respective
arguments (third derivatives zero), such that they are constant across the two regimes. In this case,
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which shows that as long as the second derivative of the utility function with respect to public
spending is not substantially larger than the second derivative with respect to private net income
in absolute value, the condition is fulfilled (For a discussion of the intuition behind this condition,
a paper going more into depth with this condition can be obtained from the author).
As a numerical example, the case of quasi linear utility clearly only allows for the derivative to be
larger in no capital mobility case.
Allowing for taxation of immobile tax bases





































on public debt in
percent of total tax
revenues, average
1970-1999
Italy 116.60 6.85 14.75 17.32
Belgium 115.90 7.05 14.97 17.64
Greece 104.63 7.44 17.86 16.28
Spain 72.45 3.63 9.75 6.48
Austria 65.18 3.90 8.03 6.41
France 64.97 3.35 6.65 4.90
Sweden 63.47 5.31 9.18 8.53
Netherlands 62.56 4.45 10.30 10.75
Germany 60.18 3.52 7.88 5.66
United Kingdom
c 56.99 2.81 6.97 8.58
Portugal 55.90 3.11 7.55 12.50
Denmark
a 55.13 4.57 8.00 11.47
Ireland
b 50.14 2.75 8.49 19.34
Finland 46.62 3.54 7.21 4.06
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. a) the average debt service per total revenue is for the years 1988 t
o1999. b) the average debt service per total revenue is for the years 1977 t o1999. c) the average debt
service per total revenue is for the years 1987 t o1999.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Uncovered Interest Parity Differential (CIP) for
EU Countries Based on own calculations, Max Sample 1977-1998






Austria 0.44 0.25 1.83 0.03 0.57 1.76 4.48 12
Belgium 0.52 0.15 3.60 0.04 0.93 2.50 8.12 18
Denmark 0.41 0.27 1.75 0.09 0.46 2.32 7.27 12
Spain 1.91 1.25 5.79 0.06 1.90 0.85 2.33 22
Finland 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.09 -0.70 1.50 3
France 0.53 0.21 1.85 0.03 0.63 1.24 2.93 16
Greece 1.89 0.96 3.88 0.85 1.72 0.70 1.50 3
Ireland 0.24 0.22 0.36 0.09 0.09 -0.10 1.88 9
Italy 1.41 0.49 4.92 0.05 1.68 1.22 2.95 21
Netherlands 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.05 1.83 6.30 14
Portugal 0.97 0.61 2.63 0.11 0.90 1.00 2.53 7
Sweden 0.43 0.36 1.71 0.09 0.39 2.18 7.62 17
United Kingdom 0.27 0.28 0.42 0.17 0.07 0.52 3.48 13	

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Austria 45.37 45.39 60.59 37.69 5.37 1.08 4.69 18
Belgium 47.42 47.86 53.36 40.21 3.96 -0.24 2.05 18
Germany 40.77 39.81 50.61 30.82 5.88 0.21 2.10 18
Denmark 75.17 68.22 108.72 66.09 14.63 1.61 4.11 9
Spain 29.15 29.19 35.17 22.06 4.39 -0.21 1.86 18
Finland 45.43 40.21 105.90 29.59 19.31 2.23 7.00 18
France 45.12 42.57 56.66 39.53 5.84 0.80 2.08 18
Greece 38.66 37.07 50.80 31.44 6.18 0.85 2.70 9
Ireland 39.46 30.54 101.93 23.83 21.29 1.95 5.74 18
Italy 42.45 40.52 58.24 30.06 7.16 0.57 2.86 18
Netherlands 39.68 40.49 47.65 31.13 4.42 -0.34 2.53 18
Portugal 20.80 20.38 25.06 16.39 2.83 -0.03 1.98 9
Sweden 65.84 63.73 95.73 45.92 13.59 0.67 2.63 18
United
Kingdom 83.57 87.20 113.44 58.86 15.09 -0.10 2.25
18
Labor Tax
Austria 36.27 35.37 42.21 33.42 2.62 1.02 2.82 18
Belgium 39.11 39.44 40.99 36.34 1.32 -0.80 2.84 18
Germany 34.69 34.85 37.15 32.44 1.41 -0.07 1.93 18
Denmark 42.06 41.82 44.78 39.95 1.81 0.20 1.46 10
Spain 27.57 28.29 31.10 22.55 2.93 -0.36 1.61 18
Finland 38.77 38.01 48.85 31.58 5.65 0.40 1.90 18
France 38.29 38.80 40.98 33.83 2.29 -0.77 2.42 18
Greece 23.12 21.99 27.56 20.16 2.44 0.35 1.92 11
Ireland 23.69 24.48 26.60 18.29 2.34 -1.33 3.84 18
Italy 31.72 31.68 38.88 25.29 3.65 0.17 2.54 18
Netherlands 41.31 41.66 43.55 37.62 1.81 -0.61 2.31 18
Portugal 22.34 22.77 23.72 20.34 1.14 -0.54 2.02 9
Sweden 48.65 48.15 52.63 45.24 2.33 0.28 1.83 18
United




Austria 16.79 16.90 17.66 15.01 0.68 -0.92 3.62 18
Belgium 15.00 14.99 16.44 14.06 0.75 0.45 2.07 18
Germany 13.13 13.08 14.41 12.39 0.55 0.61 2.90 18
Denmark 20.85 20.80 22.85 19.59 0.85 0.74 3.08 18
Spain 10.74 12.07 12.65 6.15 2.28 -1.00 2.38 18
Finland 18.78 18.61 20.75 17.75 0.86 0.98 3.00 18
France 15.60 15.72 16.19 14.61 0.45 -0.84 2.76 18
Greece 14.89 15.13 16.80 12.30 1.27 -0.47 2.40 18
Ireland 18.60 18.91 20.12 15.32 1.21 -1.42 4.52 18
Italy 12.54 12.80 14.67 10.28 1.35 -0.29 1.85 18
Netherlands 15.05 15.47 16.28 13.30 0.96 -0.58 1.96 18
Portugal 16.27 16.93 18.46 13.58 1.57 -0.47 1.77 18
Sweden 15.83 15.88 17.46 14.19 1.08 -0.05 1.69 18
United
Kingdom 14.15 14.20 15.02 13.00 0.53 -0.21 2.62
18
a: Own calculations Based on Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000)	

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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Average Effective Labor and Consumption Tax

















Austria 81.24 78.69 106.26 56.49 13.21 0.46 2.74 18
Belgium 83.09 83.57 94.94 68.52 8.07 -0.32 2.12 18
Germany 87.19 89.29 117.60 64.09 15.64 0.21 2.16 18
Denmark 57.47 59.16 66.62 36.98 10.27 -1.01 2.78 9
Spain 95.46 93.83 110.84 82.06 8.35 0.25 1.98 18
Finland 93.67 92.72 145.74 37.61 26.08 -0.18 3.33 18
France 86.60 92.43 101.93 61.37 14.39 -0.69 1.86 18
Greece 58.92 59.33 72.83 41.03 8.53 -0.62 3.75 9
Ireland 72.41 82.40 103.61 17.94 26.03 -0.93 2.67 18
Italy 75.54 76.21 84.69 60.46 6.88 -0.87 3.19 18
Netherlands 105.56 105.78 136.27 82.08 14.39 0.57 2.85 18
Portugal 108.72 109.20 124.16 93.47 11.52 -0.06 1.42 9
Sweden 76.36 76.49 105.13 53.75 13.37 0.27 2.79 18
United Kingdom 27.52 26.37 36.16 21.70 4.13 0.52 2.32 18
Effective consumption
to capital tax rate
Austria 37.40 38.02 45.44 28.11 3.80 -0.42 3.84 18
Belgium 31.89 32.58 37.41 26.51 3.46 -0.15 1.87 18
Germany 32.96 32.45 43.53 25.21 5.72 0.39 1.98 18
Denmark 28.12 29.90 31.87 20.28 3.81 -1.15 3.01 9
Spain 36.64 36.95 43.48 27.31 4.95 -0.39 2.19 18
Finland 45.58 46.54 61.98 17.63 11.01 -1.36 4.44 18
France 35.06 36.48 39.96 27.61 4.05 -0.67 2.05 18
Greece 41.14 42.67 49.43 29.45 6.75 -0.50 2.12 9
Ireland 56.06 59.41 79.82 15.03 18.67 -0.89 2.94 18
Italy 29.91 30.01 35.18 23.66 3.05 -0.25 2.92 18
Netherlands 38.38 38.80 45.93 28.94 4.87 -0.36 2.37 18
Portugal 83.35 78.82 106.49 69.47 12.16 0.68 2.34 9
Sweden 24.76 24.49 32.98 18.24 4.09 0.45 2.43 18
United Kingdom 17.56 16.20 24.49 11.84 3.78 0.51 1.97 18
a: Own calculations based on Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000)	

 	
Regression and Robustness Tests, Hypothesis 1 and 2.
Table 5: Results for the regression of taxes and expenditures, basic specification.
Sample: 1973-1999
   


















***) -0.026 (-1.62) -0.177 (-8.26
***)
INFL 0.018 (1.43) 0.066 (3.31




















DW 2.10 2.47 2.09 2.47
R








a,d F=4.81 (0.029) F=8.17 (0.005)
MAAS is a dummy for the introduction of the Maastricht treaty, taking the value 1 from 1993 and
onwards. T-stats are in parentheses and * means significant on a 10% level, ** on a 5% level and ***
on a 1% level. The Hausman tests are carried out as suggested in Greene. a) Numbers in parentheses
after test statistics are p-values. b) In the regression using DS2 but splitting up DS2 into the interest rate
term and the growth term, the F test statistic is for the restriction that the parameter estimate of the
interest rate term is equal to minus the parameter estimate of the growth-debt interaction term, which
would the use of DS2. In the unrestricted regression, the growth-debt interaction term is never
significant. c) Wald Test for significance of regression (i.e. join significance of the slope parameter
estimates).
Table 6: Results for the regression of taxes and expenditures including the Maastricht
dummy interacted with debt service. Sample: 1973-1999
   




MAAS* DS1-1 0.043 (0.33) 0.152 (0.79)
DS2-1 0.048 (1.48) -0.082 (-1.98
**)
MAAS* DS2-1 0.041 (0.95) 0.071 (1.31)
















INFL 0.019 (1.41) 0.064 (3.14










DW 2.09 2.45 2.08 2.45	
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Table 7: Robustness of the parameter estimates for the debt service term to changes in
the panel members (dropping one country at the time). Sample: 1973-1999
   
  AT   0.159 (2.28
**)   -0.363 (-3.39
***)
  BE   0.184 (1.93
**)   -0.379 (-3.24
***)
  DE   0.226 (3.23
***)   -0.355 (-3.58
***)
  DK   0.184 (2.71
***)   -0.372 (-3.96
***)
  ES   0.222 (2.95
***)   -0.353 (-3.11
***)
  FR   0.174 (2.41
**)   -0.409 (-3.87
***)
  GR   0.279 (3.71
***)   -0.587 (-5.79
***)
  IE   0.217 (3.09
***)   -0.357 (-3.49
***)
  IT   0.162 (1.86
*)   -0.412 (-3.85
***)
  NL   0.195 (2.72
***)   -0.360 (-3.35
***)
  PT   0.328 (3.97
***)   -0.244 (1.72
*)
  SE   0.185 (2.74
***)   -0.306 (-3.03
***)
  UK   0.160 (2.24
**)   -0.381 (-3.72
***)
  DK,GR    -0.609 (-5.98
***)
  ES, PT   0.348 (3.51
***)  
Table 8: Robustness of parameter estimates to the inclusion of other explanatory
variables. Sample: 1973-1999
   
BY-1 0.020 (1.65
*) -0.050 (-3.12







UB 0.040 (1.00) 0.449 (9.32












INFL 0.021 (1.42) 0.006 (0.31) 0.018 (1.37) 0.077 (4.08
***)
INFL-1 0.038 (2.74
***) -0.009 (-0.47) 0.041 (3.20
***) 0.041 (2.26
**)















EYEAR -1 0.343 (4.52
***) -0.163 (-2.25
**)
IDEO -0.093 (-1.32) -0.052 (-0.65)
DW 2.10 1.98 1.93 2.54	
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UB 0.053 (1.39) 0.341 (8.04












INFL 0.020 (1.55) 0.057 (3.07
***) 0.007 (0.44) 0.020 (0.889)
INFL-1 0.034 (2.37
**) -0.008 (-0.43) 0.010 (0.59) 0.018 (0.72)
MAAS -0.054 (-0.67) -0.237 (-2.91
***) -0.002 (-0.02) -0.395 (-3.61
***)
DIRS-1 0.027 (1.48) 0.118 (6.48
***)
DIRL-1 0.034 (1.17) 0.082 (2.30
**)
DW 2.15 2.47 2.12 2.41
a) Excluding Greece from the pool due to lack of data on long term interest rates. The change in the
parameter estimates are mostly due to this exclusion, see sequential exclusion of countries above.
Table 10: Robustness of parameter estimates to the inclusion of two additional lags of
the explanatory variables, and for the first differenced specification with growth and
inflation in levels
a. Sample: 1973-1999
   
BY-1 0.010 (1.09) 0.042 (3.27












UB 0.026 (0.64) 0.161 (3.46








GR-2 -0.023 (-1.29) -0.102 (-4.67
***)













INFL-2 0.001 (0.07) 0.094 (4.97
***)









***) 0.118 (1.23) -0.315 (-2.63
***)
DW 2.18 2.59
a: debt to GDP, debt service to GDP and unemployment are included in first differences, while growth
and inflation, which are found likely to be stationary, are included in levels.	
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a) A country specific linear time trend and fixed effects are included but not shown.
Table 12. The percentage point change in overall taxes and expenditures due to debt
service in 1999 according to parameter estimates, percent.
Taxes b
a=0.20 b=0.00 b=0.34
Austria 1.76 0.00 3.07
Belgium 3.11 0.00 5.41
Germany 1.87 0.00 3.25
Denmark 1.81 0.00 3.15
Spain 2.07 0.00 3.60
France 1.46 0.00 2.54
Greece
b 4.89 0.00 8.51
Ireland 1.73 0.00 3.00
Italy 3.18 0.00 5.54
The Netherlands 2.21 0.00 3.84
Portugal 1.80 0.00 3.14
Sweden 2.04 0.00 3.54
United Kingdom 1.53 0.00 2.67
Expenditures: b
a=-0.366 b=-0.197 b=-1
Austria -3.06 -1.64 -8.35
Belgium -6.33 -3.41 -17.31
Germany -3.06 -1.64 -8.35
Denmark -3.37 -1.81 -9.21
Spain -3.83 -2.06 -10.46
France -2.52 -1.35 -6.87
Greece
b -8.75 -4.71 -23.90
Ireland -3.60 -1.94 -9.82
Italy -6.04 -3.25 -16.51
The Netherlands -4.26 -2.29 -11.63
Portugal -2.85 -1.53 -7.79
Sweden -3.84 -2.07 -10.50
United Kingdom -2.82 -1.52 -7.72
a). The first row contains the percentage point change due to debt service in 1999 when the regression
coefficient of debt service in the basic regression is used. The two other rows show the same number for
the lowest and the highest parameter estimates for the effect of debt service on the tax ratio found in the
robustness analysis.
b) The number for Greece is calculated for 1997 due to lack of data.	
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Regression and Robustness Tests, Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Table 13: Results for the specification including Icap. Sample: 1978-1999.
 




 (DS1-1* -CIP-1) -0.007 (-0.34) -0.086 (-3.53
***)











INFL 0.037 (1.41) 0.019 (0.73)
INFL-1 0.004 (0.15) 0.026 (0.99)






Table 14: Robustness of the parameter estimates for the interaction term to changes in
the panel members (dropping one country at the time). Sample: 1978-1999.
   
  AT -0.008 (-0.38)   -0.093 (-3.69
***)
  BE   -0.012 (-0.49)   -0.087 (-2.88
***)
  DE   -0.015 (-0.61)   -0.075 (-2.93
***)
  DK   -0.003 (-0.12)   -0.049 (-1.87
*)
  ES   -0.074 (-2.01
**)   -0.077 (-1.83
*)
  FR   -0.006 (-0.27)   -0.082 (-3.20
***)
  IE   -0.009 (-0.42)   -0.088 (-3.56
***)
  IT   0.010 (0.45)   -0.125 (-4.43
***)
  NL   -0.009 (-0.43)   -0.086 (-3.38
***)
  PT   -0.010 (-0.41)   -0.063 (-2.38
**)
  SE   -0.019 (-0.89)   -0.078 (-2.74
***)




Table 15: Robustness of parameter estimates to the inclusion of a time trend and the
interest rate in the regression, and to the specification with growth and inflation in
levels
a. Sample: 1978-1999.
   






 (DS1-1* -CIP-1) -0.002 (-0.11) -0.096 (-4.35
***) -0.021 (-1.02) -0.101 (-2.38
***)
- CIP-1 -0.223 (-2.00
**) 0.364 (3.38




***) 0.037 (0.59) 0.220 (3.80
***)
GR -0.031 (-1.11) -0.209 (-9.12
***)
GR-1 -0.054 (-2.15















INFL-1 0.004 (0.163) 0.012 (0.46)
MAAS -0.242 (-1.54) -0.570 (-3.33
***) 0.348 (2.97
***) -0.036 (-0.30)




a: debt to GDP, debt service to GDP and unemployment are included in first differences, while growth
and inflation, which are found likely to be stationary, are included in levels.
Table 16. Robustness of parameter estimates to the specification: Results for the
regression estimated in LEVELS including the lagged explanatory variable and linear




















GR-1 0.028 (1.27) -0.055 (-2.60
***)
INFL 0.007 (0.28) -0.047 (-2.38
**)





Regression and Robustness Tests, Hypotheses 5 and 6
Table 17: Results for the regression of effective tax ratios, specification including
Icap. Sample: 1981-1997.
LABCAP CONCAP
BY-1 -0.077 (-1.10) 0.065 (1.80
*)
DS1-1 0.211 (0.39) -0.438 (-1.51)
 (DS1-1* -CIP-1) 0.429 (2.75
***) 0.317 (4.25
***)






















  Table 18: Robustness of the parameter estimates for the interaction term to changes in
the panel members (dropping one country at the time). Sample: 1981-1997.
  LABCAP CONCAP
  AT 0.427 (2.72
***)   0.310 (4.14
***)
  BE   0.324 (1.70
*)   0.355 (4.06
***)
  DE   0.322 (1.92
**)   0.215 (2.58
**)
  DK   0.536 (3.20
***)   0.310 (3.95
***)
  ES   0.688 (2.84
***)   0.261 (2.25
**)
  FR   0.454 (2.58
**)   0.356 (4.12
***)
  IE   0.468 (3.05
***)   0.351 (4.76
***)
  IT   0.438 (2.55
**)   0.295 (3.36
***)
  NL   0.456 (2.80
***)   0.339 (4.41
***)
  PT   0.439 (2.79
***)   0.228 (3.15
***)
  SE   0.373 (2.34
**)   0.331 (4.10
***)
  UK   0.386 (2.36
**)   0.300 (3.80
***)
NB! Only when Spain, Ireland and Italy are excluded does the DDS1 term become significantly
negative on the 5 % level in the LABCAP regression. Otherwise, and in the CONCAP regression, the
debt service term without the CIP interaction is not significant.	
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Table 19: Robustness of parameter estimates to the inclusion of time and the interest
rate in the regression, the specification with growth and inflation in levels
a. Sample:
1981-1997.
LABCAP CONCAP LABCAP CONCAP
BY-1 -0.047 (-0.64) 0.048 (1.30) 0.004(0.07) 0.083 (2.46
**)
DS1-1 0.264 (0.48) -0.581 (-1.92
**) -0.527 (-1.03) -0.816 (-2.78
***)





- CIP-1 -0.044 (-0.05) -0.675 (-1.95



























MAAS -0.633 (-0.54) -0.118 (-0.22) -0.768 (-1.15) -0.271 (-0.79)
Time 0.074 (0.59) -0.057 (-1.02)
IRS -0.043 (-0.28) -0.226 (-3.17
***)
DW 2.29 2.24
a: debt to GDP, debt service to GDP and unemployment are included in first differences
Table 20. Robustness of parameter estimates to the specification: Estimated in






BY-1 0.051 (0.79) 0.095 (3.18
***)
DS1-1 -0.418 (-0.82) -0.598 (-2.44
**)
DS1-1* -CIP-1 0.487 (3.36
***) 0.178 (2.69
***)












INFL-1 0.211 (1.22) 0.093 (1.23)




  Table 21. The percentage point change in the effective labor to capital tax ratio due to






Austria 3.12 2.41 5.00
Belgium 1.07 0.83 1.72
Denmark 0.62 0.48 0.99
Spain 4.34 3.36 6.95
France 1.25 0.97 2.01
Ireland 0.47 0.36 0.76
Italy 4.95 3.83 7.93
The Netherlands 0.34 0.26 0.54
Portugal 6.28 4.86 10.07
Sweden 0.48 0.37 0.77




Austria 2.30 1.56 2.59
Belgium 0.79 0.54 0.89
Denmark 0.46 0.31 0.51
Spain 3.20 2.17 3.60
France 0.93 0.63 1.04
Ireland 0.35 0.24 0.39
Italy 3.65 2.48 4.10
The Netherlands 0.25 0.17 0.28
Portugal 4.64 3.15 5.21
Sweden 0.35 0.24 0.40
United Kingdom 0.01 0.01 0.01
a) The first row contains the percentage points change in the effective labor or consumption to capital
tax ratio due to the average amount of debt service during 1985 to 1999 due to the country specific fall
in CIP between 1985 and 1999. The two other rows show the same number for the lowest and the
highest parameter estimates for the effect of the interaction of debt service and the CIP on the effective
tax ratios found in the robustness analysis.
b) the CIP is only available back to 1985 for BE, IT, ES, FR, NL and SE. For UK, the fall in CIP is
calculated between 1986 and 1999, for AT and DK it is change between 1987 and 1999, for IE 1990 to
1999 and for PT 1992 to 1999. DE is excluding since the change in the CIP is assumed zero. Greece is
excluded since only 3 years of the CIP were available.






















(-0.301, -0.186) - -






- CIP-1 - 0.334
(0.334, 0.364) - -0.745
(-0.745, -0.601)
a) Numbers in parentheses are the upper and lower parameter estimates found in the robustness
analysis. Only significant and robust parameter estimates are reported. - means that the parameter
estimate is not significant in the basic regression. The parameter estimates in bold are the ones relevant














































































































Fig 14: EU average effective consumption and labor tax rates 
in percent of EU average effective capital tax rate, 1980-1999. 
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